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THE LIABILITY OF A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION FOR NEGLIGENCE IN
THE ADMINISTRATION OF ITS DUTIES.
Whether or not a city is liable for negligence in the adminis-
tration of its duties depends entirely upon the nature of the duty
being performed at the time of the negligence. The natural
duties of a city are divided into two classes. There are those
sovereign duties which it performs for the general public by
virtue of its share in the sovereignty of the state from which it
derives its existence. These are classified in the books as its
governmental functions. On the other hand, the city has a private
corporate side in the maintenance of which it is called upon to
perform duties for itself. These are known as its ministerial
duties. In the exercise of the first of these, it is exempt from
civil liability for negligence while in the exercise of the second
class of functions it stands on' an equality with individuals and
private corporations. Denver v. Maurer, 47 Colo., 179.
A municipal corporation is not impliedly liable to an action for
damages either for the non-exercise of, or the manner in which
in good faith it exercises discretionary powers of a public or
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legislative character. But liability attaches when the duty ceases
to be governmental and becomes ministerial. 2 Dillon on Munici-
pal Corporations, 1157, Sec. 949; Gregg v. Hatcher, 125 S. W.,
ioo7 (Ark.).
The great trouble the courts have met has been in deciding
where one duty ends and the other begins. It has been difficult
for the courts to draw, dearly and accurately, the line of demarca-
tion between public or governmental duties, and private or cor-
porate duties. They have not experienced any difficulty in deter-
mining whether the corporation is or is not liable for a refusal to
discharge a public duty or for the manner in which it is dis-
charged. Perhaps the most difficult place to draw the line has
been between the duty to preserve the public health, which is uni-
versally regarded as a governmental duty, and the duty to keep
the streets in proper repair, which is just as generally regarded
as a purely ministerial duty. The performance of duties that
relate to the preservation of the public health and the care of the
sick are governmental duties and the city is not liable for negli-
gence in such duties. The care of streets is a private or pro-
prietary duty. 2 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, Sec. 98o.
In a recent case in the Appellate Court of Kentucky this ques-
tion came up: The appellant, Kippes, was injured by sickness re-
sulting from a drenching which she received from a hose burst-
ing while an employee of the City of Louisville was flushing the
streets. The court set forth as the only question to be considered
whether or not the flushing of the streets of the city was a public
duty undertaken by the city in the exercise of its governmental
functions, for the benefit of the people and the public generally,
or a service performed by the municipality for private or cor-
porate purposes, as distinct from its duty to the public generally.
The court answered the question by laying down the rule that a
city engaged in flushing its streets, in the interest of its inhabi-
tants and of the safety of the general public, and making no
profit for such service, is exercising a governmental duty; and
hence a person receiving personal injuries from the negligence of
its employes, or from defectiv'e hose used while flushing the
streets, has no action against the city. Kippes v. City of Louis-
ille, 131 S. W., 184. The courts of Kentucky recognize the dis-
tinction that has been pointed out above and agree that the care
of streets is a city's ministerial duty. In the case of Schwalk's
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Administrators v. The City of Louisville, 122 S. W., 86o, the
court says the rule that municipalities are liable for negligence in
not keeping their streets in repair affords an exception to the
general rule that municipalities are exempt from liability for negli-
gence in the performance of a public governmental duty imposed
upon them for corporate benefit, and for which they receive, in
their corporate capacity, no pecuniary benefit. However, the
Kentucky court is not without authority from other jurisdictions
when it draws the line thus close to the border.
The Supreme Court of Georgia draws as close a distinction in
the case of Love v. Atlanta, 95 Ga., 129. In this case, a mule at-
tached to a garbage cart of the city and being driven by a small
colored boy, ran away and ran into the plaintiff's buggy and in-
jured him. The court declared that the duty of keeping the streets
of Atlanta clear of offensive and dangerous matter devolves upon
the city board of health. The functions of this department of the
city government are purely governmental and not ministerial in
their character. It follows that if in the exercise of such func-
tions and in the discharge of the duties devolving upon this de-
partment thereunder, a private citizen is injured by the negli-
gence of one of its servants in and about such work, no right
of action arises against the city.
In a Tennessee case where the driver of a city street sprinkler
allowed it to collide with the buggy of the plaintiff, injuring his
wife, the court decided in an action for damages against the
city that a city is not liable for the negligence of the driver of a
street sprinkler in colliding with and overturning a buggy and
thereby injuring its occupant. The employee is, in such case,
engaged in the performance of a governmental, not of a mere
ministerial, duty. Conelly v. Nashville, ioo Tenn., 262.
The New York court disapproves these last two cases and their
doctrine is perhaps opposed to the weight of authority. In the
New York case, the plaintiff while attempting to board a street
car was struck by a cart in the city street cleaning department and
the court held the city liable for the negligence of the driver. It
said the duty of removing the dirt accumulating in the streets and
the ashes and garbage from the abbutting residences is no part of
the city's governmental powers and hence it is liable for the torts
of its agents while engaged in this work. Referring to the
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Georgia and Tennessee cases above, it said 
(with the greatest
deference to the learned courts by whom 
these decisions have
been promulgated): "We think they proceed 
upon a fundamental
misconception of the duty discharged by 
the municipality. That
a city is not liable for actions of its health 
department, we concede
to its fullest extent. But the work undertaken 
by the city in these
cases is not at all a part of the governmental 
work or duty of the
state in protecting the health of its citizens. 
* * * * These duties
of removing ashes and garbage from the 
lots of private resi-
dences were formerly private duties and 
are only taken over by
the city's cleaning department as has been 
the disposal of sewage
by the public sewer system and furnishing 
of water by the city
water works because of the complexity 
and restrictions of a
crowded urban life." Quill v. Mayor, etc., 
of N. Y., 55 N. Y.
Supp.,889. The New York cases are collected 
in Missano v. The
Mayor, 16o N. Y., 123. In this case the plaintiff's 
child was run
over and killed by a horse attached to an ash 
cart of the city and
the plaintiff was allowed to recover.
The Colorado court recognized that the 
general duty of a
municipal corporation to preserve the public 
health is a govern-
mental duty and the city is not liable for 
the negligence of its
employes in the performance thereof, 
but it declared that the
flushing of a storm sewer was but an act 
necessary to keep the
streets in a reasonably fit condition and 
was a private corporate
duty, although also (lone to remove a menace 
to the health of the
people, and the court held the city was 
liable for the negligence
of its employes in the performance of 
the work. Denver v.
Maurir, 47 Colo., 179.
Where in the exercise of its corporate 
powers a municipal cor-
poration creates or permits a nuisance 
by nonfeasdnce or mis-
feasance, it is guilty of a tort and liable 
to damages in a civil action
to any person suffering special damages 
therefrom. Brown v.
Scruggs, 141 Mo., 632; Gordon v. Village 
of Silver.Creek, 112
N. Y. Supp., 54. A city is liable for 
maintaining a nuisance in
the way of a dumping ground for garbage 
and refuse taken off the
streets. In the case of City of New 
Albany v.. Slider, 21 Ind.
App., 392, the city maintained a dumping 
ground near the plain-
tiff's residence. Sickness was caused in 
his family as a result and
the court awarded him damages, saying, 
a municipal corporation
is liable in damages for maintaining a nuisance 
the same as an in-
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dividual. The fact that the plaintiff was a resident of the city
and the city committed the act complained of in an effort to keep
its streets clean for the benefit of the public, will not destroy his
right to maintain an action against the city for creating a nuisance.
The city of San Antonio (Texas) was sued for trespass in driv-
ing its garbage wagons across a vacant lot belonging to the plain-
tiff. The court in awarding the plaintiff damages said, that a city
in cleaning its streets and disposing of its garbage acts for the
benefit of its own people, and not in the discharge of a duty to
the general public, primarily resting on the state, and is liable for
damages caused by the unlawful acts of its officers in so doing.
Ostram v. City of San Antonio, 94 Tex., 523. These decisions
are in line with the Federal court on this subject.
A railroad company permitted the city of Denver to maintain a
dumping ground for the city's garbage on some of its waste lands.
Fire broke out in the refuse and spread to the plaintiff's buildings
destroying them. The court held that the gathering of refuse
and waste by a city and the maintenance, establishment and oper-
ation of a dumping ground for its ultimate disposal, under the
direction of the officers of the city health department, is a duty
of local or municipal concern, not performed in the exercise of
any governmental function; and hence the city is liable for the
negligence of its officers and agents engaged in the performance
of such work. Denver v. Porter, 126 Fed., 288.
A number of cases have discussed this question in the matter
of lighting the streets of the city, under circumstances that seemed
to mingle the corporate and the governmental duties of the city.
A plaintiff's wife was injured by reason of driving into an excava-
tion in the street which was not properly lighted and which was
made by the city in putting in a city water works. The plaintiff
was allowed to recover even though the city was engaged in con-
structing a municipal water plant. Butler v. Bangor, 67 Me., 385.
A municipal corporation, which, by its charter, has the power to
lay out, improve, light and keep its streets in order, is liable in
damages at the suit of an individual who sustains injuries by rea-
son of the neglect of the corporation to keep its streets in a proper
and safe condition. Noble and Tuife v. City of Richmond, 31
Gratt. (Va.), 271. The Supreme Court of Illinois has held that a
city is under no obligations to light its streets even when granted
power by its charter to do so, but if it assumes the duty under a
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discretionary power and does it in such a negligent manner as not
to afford proper security from danger, and a person is injured by
falling into an excavation in the night time it is liable for the
injuries thereby sustained. City of Freeport v. Isbel, 83 Ill., 44o;
City of Chicago v. Powers, 42 Ill., i69.
From the cases cited it would seem that while there has been no
difficulty on the part of the courts in classifying the powers and
duties of municipal corporations, yet there has been difficulty in
determining into which class certain specific acts would fall. And
it seems farther that by the weight of authority the courts are
disinclined to draw too strict a line so as to exempt a municipal
corporation from liability to the detriment of private rights.
FEDERAL JURISDICTIONi,-HOW EFFECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS OF
LAW CLAUSE IN THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS.
The jurisdiction of the federal courts is a question which has
given a great field for learned and technical arguments, bringing
forth a diversity of opinion as to its extent. The jurisdiction of
these courts has been settled with respect to certain matters, but
there are still some cases in which the jurisdiction is open to
question, and which have not yet been decided by a court of last
resort. Article three, section two, of the federal constitution,
says, "that the judicial power of the U. S. shall extend to all
cases in law and equity arising under this constitution." The
fourteenth amendment to the constitution, in the first article, pro-
vides that, "no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law." When the same clause, or
one which in effect is the same, is found in the state constitution,
the question is, must the complainant first exhaust his remedies
in the state courts before the jurisdiction attaches to the federal
courts? This question Circuit Court Judge Morrow answers in
the affirmative, in a case decided February 6 in the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The case referred to above is that of the Seattle, Renton and
Southern Railway Co. v. The Seattle Electric Co., reported in
the San Francisco Recorder, February 14, 1911. The case was
one involving a grant of franchise to two railway companies over
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the same streets. The complaining company had the prior right,
but took its franchise under an express declaration, that it should
"not be deemed exclusive," and a reservation by the City of
Seattle of the right, "to grant to any other person or persons,
company or companies, or to any commission, or itself to exercise
the right to construct, lay down, maintain and operate a line or
lines of railway over the streets" mentioned in the franchise. The
city subsequently granted to the defendant company a franchise
to operate over a portion of the route covered by the previous
grant, but provided that if the original holder thereof "is entitled
to compensation for damages occasioned thereby, such damages
shall be ascertained and settled by the grantee, according to law."
The complainant attacked the second franchise under the four-
teenth amendment, on the sole ground that it deprived the com-
plainant of its property, "without due process of law."
The lower court, the district court, granted an injunction re-
straining the defendant company from further proceeding with the
work of laying its tracks. In this action to dissolve the injunction
the court said in part, "The presumption is that the courts of
Washington will not deny to any of its citizens or corporations the
equal protection of its constitution. If, however, it should turn
out that we are mistaken in this respect the complainant will have
his remedy in an appeal from the highest court in the state to the
Supreme Court of the United States. The doctrine here is that
the aggrieved party must first invoke the aid of the state courts,
since it is for the state courts to remedy the action of state
officers, done without authority of, or contrary to law. In such a
case the complaining party must exhaust his remedies in the state
courts by prosecuting his case in the state court of last resort for
cases of that character; and until he has done this, it cannot be
said that he has been denied due process or deprived of his prop-
erty by state action. If the decision of the highest state court to
which he can resort is adverse to him, he can then take his
case on writ of error to the United States Supreme Court, upon
the ground, not that the proceeding or action complained of was
contrary to or unauthorized by state law, but upon the ground that
what was complained of as a deprivation of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth
amendment, has at last received the sanction of the state, and, in
effect, become the act of the state itself." The court held, where
a state constitution guarantees to its citizens, in the language or the
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substance of the fourteenth amendment to the Consitution of the
United States, that "no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law," the citizen has his remedy in the state
court; and the federal courts have no jurisdiction and must not
be invoked.
All of the state constitutions have a clause which, in substance,
is the same as that in the fourteenth amendment, that "no person
shall be deprived of his property without due process of law."
And the question decided by the principle case, it seems, has never
been squarely before a court of last resort. But the question is
approached in the case of Prentive v. The Atlantic Coast Line Co.,
2IH U. S., 210, where it was held, that when an appeal to the
Supreme Court of the state, from an order of a state corporation
commission, fixing railroad rates, is given by the state constitu-
tion, it is proper that dissatisfied railroads should take this matter
to the Supreme Court of their state, before bringing a bill in the
Circuit Court of the United States. A municipal ordinance not
passed in accordance with legislative authority is not a law of a
state within the meaning of the prohibitions of the Constitution
of the United States; and a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an
ordinance alleged to have been passed in violation of the require-
ments of the state law, presents no question arising under the
constitution, which confers jurisdiction on the federal courts, on
the ground that the enforcement of the ordinance will deprive
the complainant of property without due process of law. Mayor
and City of Savannah et al. v. Hoist et al., 132 Fed., 9oi.
In Ozark-Bell Telephone Co. v. The City of Springfield, 14o
Fed., 666, it was held, that a bill by a telephone company to enjoin
the enforcement of a city ordinance, fixing maximum rates, which
alleges that the ordinance was passed in the exercise of the power
to fix rates conferred upon the city by the act of the legislature,
and that if enforced the complainant cannot make any net earn-
ings, nor sufficient to pay its necessary expenses, and. will be de-
prived of its property without due process of law, states a cause of
action arising under the federal constitution, of which the federal
courts have jurisdiction, although it further averred, as a legal
conclusion, that the ordinance is also in violation of the state con-
stitution. In McCain et al. v. The City of Des Moines et al., 84
Fed., 726, where the validity of a state statute was involved, it
was held that no federal question was thereby presented, although
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the assessment of taxes under that statute, if valid, would be a
taking of property without due process of law. But, in the Nash-
ville Car and Street Railway Co. v. Taylor et al., 86 Fed., 168,
it was held that a federal question was involved under the four-
teenth amendment to the federal constitution, where the question
was as to the validity of a tax, even though the state constitution
provided, "that all property shall be taxed according to its value,
that value to be ascertained in such a manner as the legislature
shall direct, so that the taxes shall be equal and uniform through-
out the state."
Smith v. Bivcns, 56 Fed., 352, held that a certain act deprived
the plaintiff of his property without due process of law, and that
therefore the federal court had jurisdiction. Where both parties
are citizens of the same state, the grounds upon which a federal
court can take cognizance of a suit, relating to the due process
clause of the constitution, must be clear and distinctly stated.
Hanford v. Dasies, 163 U. S., 273. A suit to restrain the
enforcement of an enactment of a city, passed in the
exercise of its delegated legislative powers, on the ground,
that they attempt to annul a contract made by a prior
ordinance, without notice to the other party, or due process
of lass, involves a question under the Constitution of the United
States, and is within the jurisdiction of a federal court, when the
requisite amount is involved, regardless of the citizenship of the
parties. American Waterworks and Guarantee Co. v. The Home
Water Co. et al., 115 Fed., 171. And where a city council passed
a resolution declaring its intention to dispossess a company of
the street by use of its police power, is a threatened violation of
the constitutional rights of the company, which a federal court has
jurisdiction to restrain. Iron Mountain Railroad Co. v. The
City of Mcmphis, 96 Fed., 113.
But in the above cases the fact that the state constitutions had
a similar clause, as that contained in the fourteenth amendment
to the federal constitution, was not raised. The cases seem to
indicate that it would make no difference even if such a clause
is found in the state constitutions.
It was held in the Consolidated Water Co. v. City of San Diego,
93 Fed., 849, that a bill to annul a city ordinance, fixing rates to
be charged by a water company, which are claimed to be so un-
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reasonably low as to amount to a practical taking of the com-
pany's property, without due process of law, presents a federal
question. City Railway Co. v. Citizens' Railway Co., I66 U. S.,
557. And where a city had a right to make a contract with a water
company ,and it made such a contract, but subsequent legislation,
both state and municipal, impair the contract rights of the water
company, it was held that the cause presented a federal question
under the constitution. Vicksburg Water Works Co. v. Vicks-
burg, 185 U. S., 65. And a suit enjoining the enforcement of an
ordinance requiring a street railway company to carry, without
pay, passengers, holding transfers from other lines, is within the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, where the invalidity of the
ordinance is alleged, on the ground that it deprives the company
of its property without due process of law, in violation of the
federal constitution. Chicago City Railway Co. v. The City of
Chicago and others, 142 Fed., 844.
In the case of the Indianapolis Gas Co. v. .The City of Indian-
apolis, 82 Fed., 285, a suit to restrain the enforcement of a city
ordinance limiting charges for artificial gas, on the ground that it
allows no profit to the gas company, and therefore deprives it of
its property without due process of law, contrary to the federal
constitution, is one involving a federal question, and a federal
court has jurisdiction, regardless of the citizenship of the parties.
Southern Railway Co. v. North Carolina Railway Corporation
Commission, 97 Fed., 513. From these cases it would seem that
the courts regard the passage of city ordinances as legislative acts
of the state, but in Huntington v. The City of New York et al.,
i i8 Fed., 163, it was held that trespasses of public officers, pro-
fessedly acting under authority of state law, but which was not
only unauthorized by said law, but by fair construction of it, was
prohibited, cannot be imputed to the state, so as to bring them
within the constitutional inhibition, to deprive persons of property
without due process of law, and on that ground to confer jurisdic-
tion upon the federal courts.
But a federal court has jurisdiction to enjoin state taxing
officers from enforcing collection of a tax upon shares of stock
in a national bank, when the protection sought is based upon the
ground, that the state statute, under which such officers are pro-
ceeding in making their assessment, is in viblation of the four-
teenth amendment to the federal constitution. Third National
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Bank of Pittsburg v. Mylin. 76 Fed., 385. And no determination
of the constitutional question involved in the making of a specific
assessment, for street improvement by an administrative board
can bar a suit in a national court, to test the question, whether by
means of such determination the state has deprived the complain-
ant of his property without due process of law. White v. The City
of Tacoma, iO9 Fed., 32.
In Barney v. The City of New York, 193 U. S., 430, it was
held, where the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is invoked on
the ground of the deprivation of property without due process of
law, in violation of the fourteenth amendment, it must appear at
the outset, that the alleged deprivation was by act of the state.
And where it appeared on the plaintiff's own statement of his case,
that the act complained of was forbidden by the state legislature
in question, the Circuit Court rightly declined to proceed further
and dismissed the suit. When it is alleged in a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, that by the action of a judge of a police
court of a city, a person has been deprived of his liberty without
due process of law, and consequently against the Constitution of
the United States, the federal court or judge thereof has jurisdic-
tion to issue a writ of habeas corpus. In re Monroe, In re Alas-
quandt, 46 Fed., 52. And where the legislature attempted to con-
vey property from one person to another without due process of
law it was held that the federal court had jurisdiction. Crystal
Spring Land and Water Co. et al. v. The City of Los Angeles,
76 Fed., 148.
Therefore, from the cases cited, it would seem that the weight
of authority is contrary to the doctrine enunciated in the principle
case. But it must be born in mind that the precise question has
not been passed on by any court of last resort, and if the question
were to be presented, the doctrine of the principle case might be
affirmed. By the authorities above cited and discussed, questions
similar to it have been decided contrary to it,-therefore it would
seem that the doctrine therein set forth is not sustained hy the
weight of authority.
wii.k'r cOXSIrITU'IT's CiI . AND INIl UMA TRir \TMNT.
One of the most confusing subjects in American divorce law
to-day is, what constitutes cruel and inhuman treatment. under
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statutes making such treatment grounds for divorce. The deci-
sions in the several states are in a state of hopeless confusion,
which it is hoped will be settled and laid at rest by some scheme
of reform legislation, which may result from a movement now on
foot, designed to accomplish such a needed and welcome reform.
The law being in such a state of conflict, it is interesting to note
the case of Zweig v. Zweig, 93 N. E. (Ind.), 234, recently decided
by the Appellate Court of Indiana.
The statute of that state, Burns' Annotated Statutes of 19o8,
section iO67, provides that cruel and inhuman treatment shall be
ground for divorce. The question was whether the defendant had
been guilty of such treatment, within the meaning of the statute.
The plaintiff and the defendant were married on November 12,
i9o4. After the lapse of six months from that date, and until
February 16, 19o7, the defendant refused to speak to or hold any
conversation with the plaintiff, or to permit her to converse in
any manner with him, and when she attempted to do so, he would
say that he wanted to have nothing to do with her. He refused
to visit the neighbors with her and would not permit the neighbors
to call on her. The court sustained a divorce granted upon these
facts, under the above mentioned statute.
In Kuhl v. Kuhl, 56 Pac., 629 (Cal.), the court held, evidence
that, after the husband without cause, had deserted his wife, who
was at the time sick, she missed her diamonds and her seal skin
sacque, and reported to friends of his, that she thought he had
taken them, is insufficient to entitle her to a divorce on the grounds
of extreme cruelty. This is in accordance with the doctrine of the
early cases, which define cruel treatment within the meaning of
the statutes, making such treatment a ground for divorce, "as
the wilful infliction of pain, bodily or mental, upon the complain-
ing party, such as reasonably justifies an apprehension of danger
to life, limb or health." Ring v. Ring, 118 Ga., 183. Therefore,
under the above definition it was held, that the habitual and in-
temperate use of morphine is-not such cruel treatment, unaccom-
panied by such conduct as laid down in the definition. The in-
tention to wound is a necessary element of the cruel treatment for
which a divorce is allowed. Ring v. Ring, Supra; Odom v.
Odom, 36 Ga., 286.
Cruel and inhuman treatment within the meaning of a statute
making such treatment a ground for divorce, is that kind of
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treatment that indicates a settled aversion to the wife and perma-
nently destroys her peace or happiness, and this character of
cruelty may habitually manifest itself in various ways that fall
short of assault or bodily injury. Hooe v. Hooe, 29 Ken. L. R.,
113. And such conduct need not be attended with an apprehen-
sion of violence or danger. Hooe v. Hooe, Supra.
The tendency of the construction of modern statutes is to allow.
a liberal one, and the modern cases have departed from the
earlier cases, which required the wilfull infliction of pain, bodily
or mental. Ring v. Ring, Supra. In Barnes v. Barnes, 95 Cal.,
171, the court said: "The tendency of modern decisions, reflecting
the advanced civilization of the present age, is to view marriage
from a different standpoint, than as a mere physical relation. It
is now more wisely regarded as a union affecting the mental and
spiritual life of the parties to a relation designed to bring to them
the comforts and facilities of home life, and between whom in
order to fulfill such design, there should exist mutual sentiments
of love and affection. 'It was formerly thought that, to constitute
extreme cruelty, such as would authorize the granting of a di-
vorce, physical violence was necessary, but the modern and
better considered cases have repudiated this doctrine, as taking too
low and sensual a view of the marriage relation, and it is now
very generally held, that any unjustifiable conduct of either the
husband or wife which so grievously wounds the feelings of the
other, or so utterly destroys the peace of mind of the other as to
seriously impair the health, or such as ultimately destroys legiti-
mate ends and objects of matrimony, constitutes extreme cruelty
under the statutes.'"
The decisions do not confine the definition of extreme cruelty
to physical violence, but the grievance whether mental or physical
must be of the most aggravated nature in order to justify a
divorce. Cooper v. Cooper, 17 Mich., 205. And profane, obscene
and insulting language habitually used toward a person of sensi-
tive nature and refined feeling may amount to extreme cruelty.
Bennett v. Bennett, 24 Mich.,. 483. Mutual wrangling over
money matters between husband and wife does not make out a
case of extreme cruelty. Belier v. Belier, 50 Mich., 49. Where
the complainant was intensely jealous of her husband without just
cause, his application to have her adjudged insane, made in a
bona fide belief that her statements attributing improper conduct
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to him, were induced by an unbalanced mind, was not such cruelty
as would entitle her to a divorce. Reichert v. Reichert, 24 Mich.,
694. Since it is held that physical violence is necessary to con-
stitute cruel and inhuman treatment, under the Illinois statute,
refusal to co-habit is not extreme cruelty. Severns v. Scverns,
1o7 Ill. App.. 14I. [ut in Cam pwell v. Campwell, I12 N. W., 481
(Mich.), it was held that the refusal of a wife for three years to
co-habit with her husband was extreme cruelty tinder a similar
statute. And in Maddox v. Maddox, 189 II1., 152, where the de-
fendant failed to supply the complainant and her children with
food and a suitable place of habitation, it was held, that under the
statute of that state cruelty, to be ground for divorce, must con-
sist of acts of physical violence. But in no instance is a single
act of physical violence sufficient ground for a divorce. Werres
v. Werres, 1o2 Ill. App., 360.
In the case of Rice v. Rice. 6 Ind.. ioo, cold neglect was
held to be cruel and inhuman treatment, and the court said with
reference to an instruction. "We may remark of this instruction
. that it seems to contemplate an entirely physical, sensual view of
the marriage relation, and if that relation has no aim to the social
happiness and mental enjoyments of those united in it, the in-
struction should have been given. But if it be otherwise, if it be
true that we are possessed of social, moral and intellectual natures.
with wants to be supplied. with susceptibility of pain and pleas-
ure; if they can be wounded and healed, as well as the physical
part, with accompanying suffering and delight, then we think that
conduct which produces perpetual social sorrow, although physical
food be not withheld, may well be classified as cruel, and entitle
the sufferer to relief."
While the earlier cases construe such statutes, making cruel
and inhuman treatment ground for divorce, with strictness, re-
quiring physical violence or acts putting the complainant in im-
mediate apprehension of danger of life, limb or health, Ring v.
Ring, Supra, the later and modern decisions seem to depart from
that rule of construction, and apply a liberal construction, which
makes it less difficult for parties to obtain a divorce. Therefore,
it appears that Zzveig v. Zueig, Supra. the principal case, al-
though in conflict with the earlier decisions, is in accord with the
modern authorities.
COMMENTS
THE INVALIDITY OF SUNDAY CONTRACTS.
In the Sentinel Co. v. A. D. Meiselbach Motor Wagon Co., 128
N. W., 861 (Wis.), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant com-
pany was indebted to them for advertising in the plaintiff's news-
paper, which was published on week-days and Sundays, and the
defendants offered as a defense the statute which prohibits labor,
business, or working, except work of necessity and charity from
being carried out on Sunday. The court decided that the plaintiff
could recover on quantnum meruit for the value of the advertising
furnished on secular days, but could not recover for work (lone
on Sunday.
In Williams v. Paid, 6 Bing., 653, which was decided a little
over a century ago, it was held that where the defendant had pur-
chased a heifer from a drover on Sunday and having made several
subsequent promises to pay for and had kept the beast he was
liable at all events on quantum meruit, notwithstanding the con-
tract was performed on Sunday. It would seem that the learned
judge in this case was willing to extend the bounds of the com-
mon law rule, which declares all contracts to be fully consum-
mated on Sunday are void and establish a precedent.
In regard to newspaper advertisements to be published on
Sunday, Smith v. Wilcox, 24 N. Y., 353, is directly in point,
holding that inasmuch as a newspaper is merchandise when sold, a
contract for the publication of an advertisement in a newspaper
to be published and sold on Sunday is a servile task and therefore
void. In Sayles v. Smith, 12 Wend., 57, although the facts are
somewhat different, the effect is the same, for that case held that
a contract made on Sunday for the publication of an advertise-
ment on week-days is not void, inasmuch as the contract would not
be performed on Sunday. In regard to a request for services
made on Sunday to be given on a week-day, the same conclusion
was reached in Dickinson. v. Richmond, 97 Masls.. 45, which held
that such a contract was valid.
It seems that the states which have not adopted the common
law rule have incorporated into their law by statute certain
provisions which bring about the same result. Most statutes
make an exception in the case of necessities and charities. Flagg
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v. Inhabitants of MillburY, 4 Cush., 243, in discussing necessities
held that what is meant by the word necessity as a work to be done
on Sunday, is not meant a physical and absolute necessity, but any
labor which is morally fit and proper to be done on that day under
the circumstances of the particular case, is a work of necessity
within the statute.
A newspaper is not, in the strict meaning of the word, a neces-
sity, however; business associations which advertise to a great
extent in newspapers and others who employ the columns of a
newspaper to bring their names and professions before the public
may regard a newspaper as a most valuable asset for bringing
success, and a Sunday advertisement is as fruit-bearing as one
published on a week-day. To publish a newspaper on Sunday and
to claim that it is a necessity may be stretching the meaning of
that word to the limit; however, in accordance with the laws of
morality to-day, the publication of a Sunday newspaper is not
generally regarded as an immoral act.
At the time the common law was invoked and most of the
states formulated their laws, the Sabbath was more reverently
kept than it is to-day, and Sunday newspapers were unknown. To
consider the publication of a newspaper a fit occupation to be per-
formed on Sunday would seem reasonable within the holding of
Flagg v. Inhabitants of Millbury, Supra, under the present laws
of morality.
Having considered the publication of a newspaper on Sunday
valid, its contents must next be considered. One of the most im-
portant elements of a newspaper is its advertising, and if we con-
sider the publication of a newspaper on Sunday as valid we must
consider the newspaper as a unit and not detract any of its com-
ponent parts, and so a contract to pay for Sunday advertising must
also be considered as valid.
The law is not in the least flexible on the point of Sunday con-
tracts and the courts cannot abahdon it entirely, and thus estab-
lish precedents, but it would seem that such laws should be
changed, so as to conform with the present-day life and in order
that one may not profit by the labor of another.
